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The last obstacle which a court would have to overcome in apply-
ing section 170 instead of section 404 would be the apparent overlap
between section 404 specifically relating to pension trusts and sec-
tion 170 which relates to charitable trusts generally. It is arguable that
the passage of a specific statute excludes the application of a general
one, but Congress is silent as to its intent in this regard. In light of
the decisions in General Shoe and Freighting, to argue along these lines
while litigating the same problem might be more profitable than
pursuing the traditional line of reasoning which has already been re-
jected in two circuits.
The conclusions that may be drawn from the decision rendered in
the General Shoe case are both philosophical and practical. Federal
courts have once again asserted that the taxation laws are not a dead
collection of words capable of only a single esoteric meaning, but they
are a living institution which must grow and mature with the econom-
ic system they were designed to accommodate. If the members of the
legislative branch of the government feel that the court was incor-
rect in its approach to this particular problem, then an amendment
may be enacted to clarify the Congressional intent. From this case
corporations which have valuable property with a comparatively low
basis are made to realize that they may not avoid the taxation of the
appreciated value of that property and benefit their own employees
at the same time.
JOEL E. KOCEN
TAXATION OF LIFE TENANTS AS TRUSTEES
The word "trust" as used in the Internal Revenue Code does not
comprehend every instance in which a trust is recognized in chancery.l
The rule has been stated that, "if no recognizable trust is impressed
on property left a decedent or purportedly set over in trust, there
is nothing to which the statute relating to taxation of trust income
can be applied."2 In United States v. DeBonchamps,3 however, a life
'Constructive trusts and resulting trusts do not come within the scope of the
Internal Revenue statutes. 6 Mertens, Taxation § 36.22 0957). See Wilcox v. Nelson,
227 Minn. 545, 35 N.W.2d 74 (1949) (defining a constructive trust); Jankowski v.
Delfert, 356 Mo. 184, 201 S.W.2d 331 (1947) (discussing situations in which chancery
courts will find a resulting trust).
26 Mertens, Taxation § 36.22 (1957).
3278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. l96o). This case was one of three cases decided in the
same opinion in which the same principles were involved.
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tenant was taxed as a trustee for the remaindermen, though it is
doubtful that an equity court would have enforced the obligations
of a true trustee against the taxpaying life tenant.
Mrs. DeBonchamps received a devise of a life estate with broad
powers to consume the corpus for her needs, maintenance and comfort,
and the remainder was devised to the donor's living children. Gains
were realized by sales of the estate's assets by the life tenant who paid
the tax thereon as owner.4 She then filed for a refund, and the gov-
ernment defended by asserting that the taxpayer was liable under
section 641(a) because of the fiduciary relationship of a life tenant
to a remainderman. 5 The Federal District Court for California6
rendered summary judgment for the taxpayer, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the relationship
between remaindermen and a life tenant with power of consumption
had the characteristics of a trust, and the capital gains realized from
sales of portions of the corpus were taxable to the life tenant as a
quasi-trustee or fiduciary for the estate.
In its decision in the principal case, the Ninth Circuit expressly
overruled its 1955 decision in United States v. Cooke,7 wherein it
was held that a life tenant was not taxable as either owner of the
estate or as trustee for the remaindermen. In that case the life tenant
was held not to be the owner of the corpus since she did not have
the unfettered right to use it for her own benefit. In deciding that
the life tenant was not a fiduciary for the remaindermen, the Cooke
decision was based upon the rationale that the relationship between
life tenant and remaindermen does not fall within the scope of Treas-
ury Regulation i f8, section 3797-3 which defines the term "ordinary
trust" as "one... in which the trustee ... takes title to the property
for the purpose of protecting or conserving it as customarily required
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 121o (pertaining to the taxation of capital gains). Un-
less this gain is taxed in the year of sale by the life tenant, it escapes taxation
altogether in the following situations: (i) where the remainderman never sells or
exchanges the property after he acquires it because upon his death the original
basis of the gift terminates, and his heirs' basis in the property becomes its value on
the death of the remainderman. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014; (2) where the life
tenant wastes the. property and it is worthless when remainder vests; (3) where
the gain is not realized until the remainder vests, and the remainderman may have
capital losses that offset the capital gain. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1201.
51f the defendant were found to be an owner of the property in question, she
would be liable for S6,622.1 7 but as a fiduciary she is only liable for S3,8o6.o7. United
States v. DeBonchamps, 278 F.2d 127, 128 (9th Cir. ig6o).
6CCH 1958 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (58-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9325 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
'228 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1955), affirming 115 F. Supp. 830 (D. Hawaii 1953).
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under ordinary rules applied in chancery and probate courts."8 The
court held that the life tenant was under no fiduciary duty to conserve
the corpus in an equity sense, and therefore was not a trustee. The
Court of Appeals in the principal case held that the Treasury Regu-
lation upon which Cooke was based was "an effort to distinguish the
so-called business trust from the ordinary type of trust.... It does not
exclude property from taxation; rather, it aids in the determining of
whether a taxable entity should be taxed as a trust or as a corpora-
tion."9 The court based this holding upon the reasoning that a tax
regulation should never be construed to exclude property from tax-
ation unless this intention is expressly stated;1 0 in this instance, such
an express exemption was not present.
In most cases with facts similar to those of the instant case, two
theories have been used; (i) the life tenant is owner of the income,
and (2) the life tenant is a fiduciary of the estate for the remainder-
men. Of course, if neither of these theories is applicable, there should
be no tax upon the sale.
With reference to the first contention, the government generally
argues that the legislature in seeking proper subjects of taxation will
not be bound by traditional classifications of interests and estates,
but "it may tax not only ownership, but any right or privilege that
is a constituent of ownership."-" A life tenant with power to consume
possesses some of these privileges of ownership, i.e., the power to .dis-
pose of the corpus and the right to receive income therefrom. There-
fore, the government argues that one whose power of consumption
is limited solely by such indefinite standards as needs, maintenance
and comfort in reality has an unfettered right to take and enjoy the
'Treas. Reg. 118, § 39-3797-3 (939). The term "trust" was used for the first
time in reference to a taxable entity in Smietanka v. First Trust 0= Say. Bank, 257
U.S. 6o, 607 (1922). The regulation itself did not appear until years later at a
time when the problem of separating business associations from trusts for tax pur-
poses received widespread attention. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
An analysis of the entire regulation indicates that the Treasury Department was
endeavoring in that particular section to clarify the distinctions between taxable
groups. The reasoning' of the principal case on this point appears to stand on
better authority than the reasoning on the same point propounded by United States
v. Cooke, 228 F.2d 667 (9 th Cir. 1955).
"United States v. DeBonchamps, supra note 3 at 132.
10The basis for this statement is the Supreme Court's mandate that the legisla-
tive purpose of the revenue acts is "to reach all gain constitutionally taxable unless
specifically excluded." General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434,
436 (1955); Irwin v. Gavit, 268 US. 161, 166 (1925); Security-First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 181 F. Supp. 911, gi8 (S.D. Cal. i96o).
"Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 67o, 678 (1933).
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corpus as well as the income, and is an owner in all but name.12 This
argument has not prevailed.'3 Where the life tenant's powers are
narrower than those granted to Mrs. DeBonchamps, it has been sum-
marily held that it would be unjust to tax as owner one who will
never own the property.' 4 On the other hand, the government's case
becomes stronger when the life tenant has more privileges, including
the right to consume. In Smith v. United States'5 the life tenant had
the power to convey, encumber or consume the estate without limita-
tion, and was held to be taxable as owner of the estate. The situation
presented in Smith is rarely found because in most cases there are
some limitations upon the life tenant's powers and even if none are
expressed, some are implied.' 6 The limitations or standards are usu-
ally rather vague words or phrases, such as "for his needs," or "for
needs, maintenance and comfort," or "for support." Even these seem-
ingly nebulous limitations have generally been sustained as sufficient-
ly clear boundaries to constitute real limitations upon the life tenant's
powers.17 Whether the standard of use will suffice as a real restriction
Corliss v. Bowers, 281 US. 376 (1930), wherein the court stated, "taxation
is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command
over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid." Id. at 378.
"In Mercer, 7 T.C. 834 (1946), a life tenant with powers similar to those of the
defendant in DeBonchamps was held to be the owner of the property and not a
trustee. However, this case appears to stand alone, and the government did not cite
it as authority for its position, relying rather on Helvering v. Clifford, 309 US.
331 (194o) and Helvering v. Horst, 311 US. 112 (1940).
14Gaskil v. United States, CCH 196o Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (6o-2 U.S. Tax Cas.)
9692 (N.D. Tex. 196o).
15265 F..d 834 (5th Cir. 1959). Here it was held that a life tenant, having un-
restricted control of the income of the corpus, is taxable upon the entire income
whether or not he actually takes or uses it since in reality he is the owner of the in-
come. See also Flato v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 58o (5th Cir. 1952); Spies v. United
States, i8o F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 195o); Grant v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 891 (5th Cir.
1949); Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d i (8th Cir. 1945); Jergens v. Commissioner.
136 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1943); Irish v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1942);
Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d i (2d Cir. 1941).
"Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894)- A duty to use good
faith in regard to a remainderman was implied against a life tenant given the
power to consume the corpus for her support.
"Even though power to consume is given in relatively broad terms, there is a
strong tendency for courts to require good faith exercise of the power." 4 Simes
& Smith, Future Interests § 1716 (1956).
' TFunk v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 195o); Smither v. United States,
io8 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. Tex. 1952); King v. Hawley, 113 Cal. App. 2d 534, 248 P.d
491 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Shedd's Adm'r v. Gayle, 288 Ky. 466, 156 S.W.d 490 (1941);
In re Gile's Estate, 95 N.H. 27o, 61 A.2d 798 (1948); Seaward v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 415,
91 N.E. 11o7 (191o); Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894); In re
Powell's Estate, 340 Pa. 404, 17 A.2d 391 (1941); Collins v. Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co., 178 Va. 5o, 17 S.E.2d 413 (1941).
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upon the life tenant's rights is a question of judicial construction, and
only if the standard is so vague that there is no basis for limiting his
powers will the life tenant be held to be the owner of .the property.' 8
The government's second contention in cases like DeBonchamps
is that the corpus of the estate should be recognized as property held
in trust by the life tenant as trustee.19 This means that under section
641(a) of the Internal Revenue Code the life tenant is taxable as a
trustee for capital gains realized by the estate. In order to sustain
this contention, the court must find that the life tenant is a fiduciary
for the remaindermen. At common law an ordinary life tenant owed
certain duties to his remaindermen, e.g., to refrain from waste or un-
reasonable use of the property, to pay currenf taxes and to keep down
interest on the property.20 Because of these duties, a majority of courts
hold that there is a weak relationship of fiduciary or quasi-trustee
between a life tenant and his remaindermen. 21 The basis for this
holding appears to be two fold: (i) These successive interests in the
same thing give the two a common purpose; and (2) a life tenant in
possession has the physical power to affect the interest of the re-
maindermen in a manner comparable to the power of a trustee over
the interests of a beneficiary. Both Scott 22 and Bogert23 have criticized
the majority rule, asserting that at best there is only a weak confiden-
tial relationship between the parties. Therefore, they say that if the
testator in creating a life estate and a remainder appoints the life
tenant as trustee, but gives him no duties, he will have created noth-
ing more than a mere life tenancy and the words of trust will be
"Compare Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 834 (5 th Cir. 1959) with Funk v.
Commissioner, 185 F.2d 127 (3 d Cir. 195o) and Smither v. United States, io8 F.
Supp. 772 (S.D. Tex. 1952). See also, Note, 60 Yale L.J. 1426 (1951).
9"This proposition was recently accepted in Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 181 F. Supp. 911 (S.D. Cal. 196o) and Weil v. United States, s8o F. Supp. 407
(Ct. Cl. 196o). But see Gaskill v. United States, CCH 196o Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
(60-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9692 (N.D. Tex. 196o) and United States v. National City Bank,
21 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y 1937) where the court appointed a trustee to pay the
capital gains tax involved
20i Tiffany, Real Property § 63 (3d ed. 1939).
"Bell v. Killian, 266 Ala. 12, 93 So. 2d 769 (1957); Wagner v. Mosley, 1o4 So.2d 86 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1958); Burlington County Nat'l Bank v. Braddock, 24 N.J.
Super. 462, 94 A.2d 868 (Super. Ct. 1953); In re Reckford's Will, 3o7 N.Y. 165, 10o
N.E.2d 696 (1954); In re Estate of Kyle, io6 Ohio App. 502, 155 N.E.2d 498 (1958);
Commercial & Say. Bank v. Burton, 185 Va. 133, 31 S.E.2d 289 (1944). See also Annot.,
137 A.L.R. 1054 (1942); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 301.13 (195o) (changing the relation-
ship between life tenants and remaindermen to one of fiduciary rather than that
of debtor-creditor).
-1 Scott, Trusts § 24.1 (2d ed. 1956).
21 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 27 (95).
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treated as surplusage. This principle was stated in Schaefer v. Schaef-
er24 as follows:
"A trusteeship cannot be predicated of [sic] one who holds for
life only, and for his or her own sole use or benefit, and the in-
strument which gives the life estate also gives the remainder
to others in their own right, and no duty, other than those that
grow out of this legal relation, is imposed upon the life ten-
ant."
25
Bogert argues that " the status of life tenant and remainderman lacks
both the kind of division of ownership found in trust and the broad
fiduciary nature of the latter relationship."26 A fiduciary relationship
has been defined as one whose characteristics are "analogous to that
of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidence involved in it and
the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires. Thus, a per-
son is a fiduciary who is invested with rights and powers to be exer-
cised for the benefit of another person."27 It would be preferable if
the majority of courts would label the life tenant a partial fiduciary
but not a trustee for the remaindermen, since he may deal with the
remaindermen at arms length in purchasing or acquiring their inter-
est.
28
When the life tenant is given powers additional to those he pos-
sesses as an ordinary life tenant, such as the power to consume, a
majority of jurisdictions29 still treat him as a quasi-trustee or a fiduci-
ary, and California designates the relationship involved as one "in
the nature of a trust."30 It would seem that the arguments against the
treatment of ordinary life tenants as fiduciaries would apply with
equal force here. Moreover, in the instant case the so-called trustee
is given the individual right of possession and consumption of the
trust res which is contrary to all common-law concepts of trusts and
trust relationships. 3 1 Even in the light of this logic the courts in tax
cases may be said to have accepted the difficulties inherent in the
majority rule in order to reach the desired result.
"141 Ill. 337, 31 N.E. 136 (1892). See also, Thompson v. Adams, 205 IMl. 552,
69 N.E. 1 (19o3).
ZSchaefer v. Schaefer, 141 Ill. 337, 31 N.E. 136 (1892).
"Note 23 supra at 218.
"Black, Law Dictionary (4 th ed. 1951) (quoting definition of "fiduciary').
"Varfield v. Bixby, 51 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1931); Mallett v. Hail, 129 Me. 148,
15o At. 531 (1930).
"9Cf. authorities cited note 21 supra. The courts apparently do not distinguish
between ordinary life tenants and life tenants with additional powers in applying the
majority rule which designates a life tenant to be a fiduciary for the remaindermen.
3*King v. Hawley, 113 Cal. App. 2d 534, 248 P.2d 491, 494 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
11n re Walsh's Estate, 239 Pa. 6M6, 86 Ad. 1o91 (1913).
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After finding the life tenant to be a fiduciary, the Court of Appeals
in the principal case held the tenant taxable under section 641(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code which applies to estates and trusts, in-
cluding "income accumulated in trust for the benefit of unborn or
unascertained person or persons with contingent interests, and income
accumulated or held for future distribution under the terms of the
will or trust .... 32 The court then designated this weak fiduciary a
trustee by use of section 7701(6) which defines a fiduciary as "a guard-
ian, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver, conservator, or any per-
son acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person." 33
Essentially a trust involves divided ownership of property, with
the trustee holding legal title and the cestui que trust having the
equitable interest.34 It is obvious that there is not such a split owner-
ship between the life tenant and remainderman because both hold le-
gal estates.35 Also implicit in the trust concept is the close confidential
relationship between the trustee and the beneficiary. 36 The highest
degree of good faith is required of the trustee in acting for the best
interests of the cestui que trust. However, in DeBonchamps and similar
cases the courts have forgotten established principles by labeling
a life tenant as a trustee because they are in effect saying that one
with the power to consume the res and deal with the beneficiary at
arms length is a trustee.3 7
From the foregoing it is obvious that the term "trust" is given a
different construction in chancery than in tax proceedings. This spe-
cific instance evidences the supposition that legal relationships bind-
mInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 641(a).
'int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(6).
354 Am. Jur. Trusts § 4 (1954).
31Note 23 supra at 218.
"'A trustee must act in good faith in the administration of the trust, and this
requirement means that he must act honestly and with the finest and undivided
loyalty to the trust, not merely with the standards of honor required of men deal-
ing at arm's length in the workaday world, but with a punctilio of honor of the most
sensitive." 54 Am. Jur. Trusts § 311 (1954)-
-Some further difference between the duties of a life tenant toward his remain-
derman and those of a trustee in regard to the cestui que trust are: (i) A life tenant
is only required to deal with the property as he normally would if he was the
owner of the fee. Therefore, the life tenant's duty to the remainderman is purely
negative, e.g., not to injure the remainderman's interest, while the trustee has the
affirmative duty to devote his best efforts for the benefit of the beneficiary. Restate-
ment, Property § 204 (1936); (2) While the trustee cannot relieve himself of obli-
gations merely by transfer or abandonment of the trust res, a life tenant can sub-
stitute another for himself by selling his interest. Loring, A Trustee's Handbook § 8
(194o); (3) While a life tenant has a beneficial interest in the property as well as
control of it, the trustee merely manages the property for the benefit of others. Re-
statement, Property § 2o4(a) (1936).
i96i]
